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Influenza Mandates and
Religious Accommodation:
Avoiding Legal Pitfalls
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss and V.B. Dubal

H

igh vaccination rates of health care workers (“HCW”) confer important benefits in
harms prevented and costs saved. 1 However, employers requiring annual influenza vaccines
need to consider federal (and state) laws that protect
employees from religious discrimination. In the past
few years, several lawsuits addressing religious discrimination have been filed against employers imposing a mandate. The policies challenged in these cases,
and anecdotal discussion with practitioners, suggest
there is some confusion about the state of the law.
This article first examines how federal law that protects against religious discrimination in the workplace
interacts with influenza mandates. It then goes on to
discuss what recent lawsuits teach us about religious
exemptions to these mandates. We emphasize that
in the case of influenza vaccines, employers may not
be required to offer a religious exemption. In fact,
we argue that offering such an accommodation may
increase the health care institution’s risk of liability.
We do not review litigation around collective bargaining agreements and the division of roles between
employers and employees, which deserve their own
treatment.2

The Justification for Workplace Influenza
Mandates:
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recomDorit Rubinstein Reiss, LL.B., Ph.D., is a Professor of Law
at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law
who specializes in law and policy related to vaccines. V.B.
Dubal, J.D., Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Law at the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law who specializes in employment law and employment discrimination,
and researches the intersection of work law and social change.
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mends that healthcare workers be vaccinated against
influenza both for their own protection and that of
vulnerable patients.3 Indeed, a recent review pointed
to direct evidence that healthcare workers transmit influenza to patients and that the vaccination of
healthcare workers against influenza decreases mortality. The review suggested it may also confer other
benefits in reducing illness.4 A vaccination requirement by employers is thus an effective way to prevent
death and illness. Studies confirm that employers who
require that healthcare workers (“HCW”) receive an
annual influenza vaccine achieve dramatically higher
rates of coverage than employers who do not.5 Other
methods of increasing coverage — improving education, making the vaccines easily accessible — are
helpful, but to a much lesser degree.6 Empirical evidence suggests that influenza vaccination rates among
health care institutions (hospitals, hospices, nursing home, and other similar facilities) that require
healthcare workers be vaccinated have compliance
rates above 90%, while health care institutions without such requirements have rates as low as 44.9%. A
review of the literature by Wang et. al. confirms that
“only an institutional mandate for influenza vaccination proved to achieve the … objective of vaccinating
90% of H[ealth] C[are] P[roviders].”7
For these reasons, multiple medical organizations, including the American Academy of Family
Physicians, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the
American Hospital Association, the American Medical Directors Association, the American Pharmacists
Association, and many others, support mandatory
influenza vaccination for HCWs.8 To complement this
empirical reality, scholars have also argued that health
care institutions are ethically obligated to mandate
influenza vaccination of their staff.9
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The Legal Framework
Employers have broad power to institute workplace
health and safety regulations, and employees cannot
unilaterally reject workplace requirements absent a
protective statute or judicial doctrine. What specific
federal law should hospital employers be concerned
about when considering vaccination mandates?
The most important set of laws governing the scope
of workplaces rules and regulations are anti-discrimination statutes. The cases we review below allege
religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which applies directly to private
employers and, with important limits, requires that
employers provide religious accommodations.
Constitutional law also provides religious protections, but for two significant reasons, cases challeng-

accommodation” when a work requirement or practice violates an employee’s sincere religious beliefs.
Two threshold questions arise in relation to accommodations to influenza mandates: First, what makes
a vaccination accommodation “reasonable” under a
Title VII? Second, what constitutes a sincere religious
belief?

Reasonable Accommodation
To be reasonable, an accommodation need not be the
one preferred by the employee. In fact, the case law
suggests that if the accommodation imposes more
than minimal costs to the employer, the employer
does not have to provide it.12 As we address separately
below, given the high burdens of influenza vaccine
accommodations, health care institutions may not be
required to provide a religious exemption at all. To date, no good, viable substitute for influenza vaccination prevents
Two threshold questions arise in
transmission of the flu. Masks, the most
relation to accommodations to influenza
commonly utilized alternative, have submandates: First, what makes a vaccination
stantial problems. Evidence suggests
that mask compliance is limited and that
accommodation “reasonable” under a Title
its effectiveness in preventing transmisVII? Second, what constitutes a sincere
sion is mixed.13 Enforcing a continuous
religious belief?
requirement like masks is clearly more
onerous and less effective compared to
a one-time vaccination. The potential
ing vaccination mandates are much more likely to
costs of preventable influenza cases include missed
arise under Title VII than under the First Amendworkdays and sick or dead patients — both significant
ment’s free exercise clause. The First Amendment only
burdens for hospital employers.14
applies to state actors, and, therefore, does not cover
private employers (like most health care institutions).
Sincere Belief
Second, federal jurisprudence limits the application
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
of the First Amendment to laws (and by implication,
(EEOC) — the government agency tasked with enforcpolicies) that are facially neutral — meaning laws that
ing Title VII — defines religion as “moral or ethical
do not explicitly discriminate against any particubeliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sinlar minority group.10 Vaccine mandates are facially
cerely held with the strength of traditional religious
neutral; they are not aimed at a religious group, and
views.”15 The jurisprudence suggests that religious prohence, can withstand that test. Thus, a claim against
tection under Title VII is much broader than merely a
an employer alleging a First Amendment violation for
belief in God. A recent case suggests, for example, that
failure to provide a religious exemption to a vaccine
it could be interpreted to include a vegan worldview.16
mandate is likely to fail. Also, the litigation history of
However, protection from religious discrimination is
cases challenging school immunization requirements
not unlimited, as discussed in the next sections. To jussuggests that if allegations that mandates violate the
tify an accommodation, the belief must be “sincerely
First Amendment arise, then they will be unsuccessheld.”17 In making this evaluation, a hospital employer
ful.11 State level constitutional and statutory requiremay consider factors that undermine the sincerity
ments, like a Religion Freedom Restoration Act, may
of the employee’s religious beliefs, such as an earlier
also exist, but our focus here is on federal law applirequest with a secular reason or behavior inconsistent
cable to all health care institutions.
with regard to the belief.18
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act forbids employWhile the EEOC’s interpretation is not authoritative
ers from discriminating against employees based
— courts have and do independently interpret Title
on, among other things, their religion. This prohibiVII — its definition is important in two ways. First,
tion requires that an employer provide “reasonable
the EEOC uses this definition in deciding whether to
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sue employers. Because the EEOC is a repeat player
with decades of experience interpreting federal antidiscrimination laws, the lawsuits brought by the
agency may be a warning sign to health care institutions that there is a real problem. Second, courts may
accord deference to reasonable agency interpretations
of their own statutes.19
Is a Religious Exemption Desirable or Necessary?
Since the risk of litigation also exists with a religious exemption in place — and, as we describe, may
increase if the religious exemption does not meet legal
requirements — health care institutions should seriously consider whether it is desirable or necessary
to offer a religious exemption at all. Title VII applies
whether or not the hospital has an official religious
exemption. An employee may request accommodation even without formal exemptions, and the hospital
will need to consider what is required under federal
law. Offering a formal religious accommodation can
have the advantage of institutionalizing procedures
and guidance. On the other hand, creating an official
exemption can be seen as embracing or legitimizing
refusal. Importantly, it may also increase the visibility of refusal and lead to more exemption requests,
including by employees who may otherwise not ask for
them. Policies can be put in place to address a request
for accommodation without creating a formal exemption. The question then becomes whether or not the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires accommodating an
employee who states a religious opposition to influenza vaccines — or whether an accommodation is otherwise desirable or necessary.
During the 2009 H1N1 epidemic, the EEOC issued
guidelines regarding influenza mandates in the workplace that may be interpreted to require a religious
exemption.20 Specifically, the guidelines stated that
…under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, once an employer receives notice that
an employee’s sincerely held religious belief,
practice, or observance prevents him from taking
the influenza vaccine, the employer must provide
a reasonable accommodation unless it would
pose an undue hardship as defined by Title VII
(‘more than de minimis cost’ to the operation
of the employer’s business, which is a lower
standard than under the ADA).21 (our italics)

Implementing an Existing Religious
Exemption: Pitfalls and Solutions

This language, however, does not mean that the EEOC
interprets the law to require a religious exemption.
The document reiterates that an exemption is only
required if it is not an “undue hardship.” The bar for
what constitutes an undue hardship is low. Our read758

ing is that employers have a strong case that the risks
posed by influenza transmission from an unvaccinated hospital employee constitute more than a de
minimis burden. As we discuss above, masks are not
an effective precaution as a substitute, given the mixed
evidence on their effectiveness and the difficulty to
enforce constant wearing.22 Reassigning an employee
is an option, but is not always feasible. A hospital that
concludes that a religious exemption imposes a real
burden can likely justify not providing one, though it
would still have to consider such requests to comply
with Title VII.
Religious freedom is important in the United States,
among other things because of historical discrimination against religious groups.23 However, Title VII has
never required unlimited and unrestricted accommodation of religious beliefs because other interests also
matter. In the health care institution context, a HCW’s
desire not to vaccinate against influenza increases
the risk of influenza transmitted to fellow employees
and patients. This great risk — in a profession that is
already highly regulated — is why ethics scholars support mandates.24 The risk to life is not eliminated or
curtailed because the employee’s reason not to vaccinate is religious. Even when weighed against the
iniquities of religious discrimination, the burden on
the hospital — and its patients — likely constitutes an
undue hardship.
Despite a strong legal argument that health care
institutions need not provide religious accommodations in this context, we found that ironically, all the
health care institutions that faced Title VII litigation
challenges did, in fact, provide a religious exemption.
In some contexts, public (though not private) health
care institutions may see no other choice. Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts in some states require an
exemption.25 In the cases we review, however, the
health care institutions seemed to act out of respect
for religious values, or a belief — supported by some
— that an exemption is required.26 HCW complaints
focused on the application of these accommodations,
not on the lack of one. We examine these cases as cautionary tales for health care employers.

In 2016, the EEOC has sued three health care institutions for alleged religious discrimination regarding
religious exemptions for influenza mandates. Two of
these cases settled, and one remains open.27 Two other
cases brought by individual employees were decided
against the employees.28 In 2018 the EEOC brought
another case against a hospital, and referred one
more to the Department of Justice, which brought
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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suit against the hospital.29 The recent involvement of
the EEOC, in particular, helps shed light on how the
regulatory agency thinks about Title VII liability as it
relates to exemptions. Together, these recent lawsuits
provide four key lessons in Title VII compliance for
employers.30
What is a Sincere Religious Belief?
The first lesson is that health care institutions may
be held liable for their evaluation of what constitutes
a “sincere religious belief.”31 A recent consent decree
between the Saint Vincent Hospital in Eerie, Pennsylvania and the EEOC, underscored that an employer
cannot limit religious exemptions to people belonging
to an organized religion that prohibits vaccines.32 Similarly, in EEOC v. Ozaukee County, a nursing home was

approach has three important advantages. It allows the
hospital to examine the sincerity of the religious belief
while avoiding the pitfall of discriminating between
organized religions and other sincere religious beliefs.
It also reduces the risk of illegally judging the relative
merit of a religious belief.36 Notably, litigation from
the school exemptions context teaches us that a member of a religion that supports vaccines — like Catholicism or Judaism — may still claim exemption based
on personal religious beliefs against vaccines.37 This
approach helps to address these potential variations
and sources of sincerely held religious beliefs.38
Of course, not every belief qualifies as religious.
In Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center39 the 3rd
Circuit examined the limits of what constitutes “religious,” and suggested a clear and useful test. The

The first lesson is that health care institutions may be held liable for their
evaluation of what constitutes a “sincere religious belief.” A recent consent
decree between the Saint Vincent Hospital in Eerie, Pennsylvania and the
EEOC, underscored that an employer cannot limit religious exemptions to
people belonging to an organized religion that prohibits vaccines. Similarly,
in EEOC v. Ozaukee County, a nursing home was sued because a requirement
for an exemption was a letter from a clergy person. Because the HCW did not
belong to an organized religion and could not get such a letter, she was denied
the exemption. Such limitations discriminate against people who are not part
of an organized religion but who hold sincere religious beliefs against vaccines.
sued because a requirement for an exemption was a
letter from a clergy person. Because the HCW did not
belong to an organized religion and could not get such
a letter, she was denied the exemption.33 Such limitations discriminate against people who are not part of
an organized religion but who hold sincere religious
beliefs against vaccines.
We agree that providing equal treatment to people
with similarly sincere beliefs, whether or not their
beliefs find their roots in an organized religion, is
appropriate, and that any other approach would
be discriminatory. But we also understand why
health care institutions would be inclined to use this
approach, which gives them an objective tool to assess
“sincerity” that is easier to use than an examination
of an employee’s heart and mind. Nevertheless, this
approach is clearly impermissible.34
A reasonable alternative may be to ask an employee
requesting an exemption to write out and explain the
beliefs behind the refusal (as suggested in Opel35). This

three-part test adopted by the 3rd circuit (drawing on
Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania40) included
the following inquiries: (1) does the religion address
fundamental and ultimate questions, (2) is it a comprehensive belief system, and (3) is it more than an
isolated teaching, as often recognized by formal and
external signs.41
The 3rd circuit concluded that the plaintiff, Mr. Fallon, failed this test because his beliefs did not address
fundamental matters, but rather were based on disbelief of the scientific consensus that the vaccine is safe.
The court wrote, “the basis of his refusal of the flu vaccine — his concern that the flu vaccine may do more
harm than good — is a medical belief, not a religious
one.” The decision also pointed out that the one moral
commandment Mr. Fallon relied on—that he should
not do harm to his body — was “an “isolated moral
teaching”; by itself, this belief was not a comprehensive system of beliefs about fundamental or ultimate
matters.”42
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other employees. It also promised to inform employees more clearly of the influenza mandate policy,
including exemptions.43
Ultimately, the core issue in Mission Hospital
was the differential treatment of employees seeking exemption from the mandate and employees not
seeking an exemption. Employees who intended to
get vaccinated, but who missed the deadline, were
offered a grace period to comply.44 Those who missed
the deadline and intended to request an
exemption, were not offered the same
grace period. The EEOC used this treatOur review of recent lawsuits suggests
ment as a yardstick by which to evaluate
important lessons for how health care
whether there was underlying religious
discrimination.
institutions can properly administer religious
In Memorial Hospital, a similar case
exemptions and avoid some of the mistakes
involving disparate treatment — the
associated with litigation. Based on our
latest to date — the EEOC brought suit
against a hospital in Michigan which
review, we also maintain that any religious
rescinded an employment offer to a
exemptions to flu mandates granted a
medical transcriptionist who claimed
HCW with patient contact may, one, pose
religious opposition to influenza vaccines.45 The basis of the claim was that
an unreasonable burden to the healthcare
the prospective employee offered to wear
facility and thus not be required under
a mask during influenza season. While
federal laws, and two, open the employer up
the hospital refused her accommodation,
it did allow other employees with medito additional legal scrutiny.
cal problems to wear a mask.
Thus, a third lesson is that different
treatment of employees requesting relition as a resignation, which allowed her to apply to
gious exemptions compared to employees seeking
open positions in the future. After costly litigation,
medical exemptions or unexempt employees may trigthe federal district court ruled for the hospital, findger EEOC scrutiny. That does not mean employers caning that the employer had gone above and beyond its
not make distinctions. It just means that health care
duty under Title VII. Robinson thus also suggests that
institutions need to be mindful and make sure distincefforts to reassign an employee to another position can
tions can be well justified. At least two justifications
be a reasonable accommodation, even if such efforts
may support, for example, distinguishing between
are not successful.
employees seeking religious exemptions and those
seeking medical exemptions. First, legally, the frameWhen is Disparate Treatment a Problem?
work for seeking medical and religious exemptions
Note that health care institutions may face litigation
is different — while the standard for undue burden
even when policies, on their face, appear reasonable,
under Title VII is very low, as described, the standard
especially if there is any disparate treatment between
for refusing exemptions under the Americans With
employees seeking an exemption and those not treatDisabilities Act, which would govern medical exemping an exemption. In EEOC v. Mission Hospital, for
tions, is much higher.46 On the merits, too, employers
example, the EEOC claimed that the hospital’s Sepmay justifiably see medical exemptions as less potentember 1st deadline to request an exemption from an
tially common than religious ones. The acknowledged
influenza vaccine mandate was unreasonable, even
medical barriers to receiving flu vaccines are very few,
though the deadline corresponded with flu season.
and the number of healthcare workers in that catThe court denied summary judgment, and the parties
egory should be minute, but any number may claim
settled, with the hospital compensating the employa religious exemption. Health care institutions need
ees — though not reinstating them — and agreeing
to be aware, however, that disparate treatment among
to offer employees seeking a medical and religious
employees can lead to closer scrutiny from the EEOC
exemption the same grace period that it offered all
and potentially increase the chances of litigation.
When is a Religious Accomodation “Reasonable”?
A second lesson gleaned from recent cases is that if
a hospital provides religious accommodations, it may
face litigation over what is “reasonable.” In Robinson
v. Children’s Hospital Boston, a HCW claimed that
her religion opposed vaccines and asked for an accommodation. The hospital attempted to locate a position
outside of patient areas for the HCW. When no such
position was found, the employer treated her termina-
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What about HCWs without Patient Interaction?
Finally, a fourth important lesson from recent litigation is that health care institutions should carefully evaluate the benefits of vaccine or masking
requirements for employees who do not interact with
patients, and consider whether a requirement that
these employees vaccinate or mask is appropriate. For
such employees, accommodation may be considered a
de minimis burden, since the risk of harm is relatively
remote. In an open case, EEOC v. Baystate, a HCW
with religious objections to vaccines was terminated
after she did not wear the required mask during work
hours. She then sued. The EEOC’s complaint on her
behalf emphasized that the employee was not working in areas in which she had contact with patients.
We do not know how the court will rule, but health
care institutions should consider whether a masking
requirement (or even a vaccination requirement) for
employees who do not interact with patients can be
justified, substantively and legally.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Conclusion
Reducing influenza in healthcare facilities is an important public health goal. Workplace mandates are an
effective tool to achieve this, and being mindful of the
law can make implementing these requirements easier and more effective. While hospital employers can
never completely insulate themselves from legal challenges associated with such mandates, understanding
the contours of recent lawsuits can reduce the risk of
litigation and increase the chances of defeating any
claims that are brought. Our review of recent lawsuits suggests important lessons for how health care
institutions can properly administer religious exemptions and avoid some of the mistakes associated with
litigation. Based on our review, we also maintain that
any religious exemptions to flu mandates granted a
HCW with patient contact may, one, pose an unreasonable burden to the healthcare facility and thus
not be required under federal laws, and two, open the
employer up to additional legal scrutiny.47
Note
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public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2018-01226.pdf> (last
visited July 20, 2018)). It is too early to know what, exactly,
the department would do, and whether it would affect the
situation in relation to influenza mandates. We live this for
future examination, both because this is outside the scope of
the paper and because it is not yet clear whether it would
affect the legal situation, and in which ways.
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